

EU and euro area: latest developments

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The Outright Monetary Transactions program



Adopted by ECB 6 September 2012

Legal basis: Art. 18.1 Statute ECB: the Eurosystem may “**operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright ... marketable instruments**”.

Objective: “safeguard the monetary policy **transmission mechanism** in all countries of the euro area
“preserve the **singleness** of ECB’s monetary policy”
“ensure the proper transmission of ECB’s policy stance to the **real economy** throughout the area”
“address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in particular, **unfounded fears** on the part of investors of the **reversibility** of the euro.”
“if not addressed, these conditions would have severe consequences for the maintenance of **price stability**”

Legal doubts by the media: OMT runs against the **prohibition of monetary financing** for Eurosystem central banks.

The Outright Monetary Transactions program (2)

Art. 123 EU Treaty prohibits the Eurosystem the “direct purchases of public debt instruments ”

An implementing Council Regulation prohibits the **circumvention** of such prohibition in cases of secondary market purchases.


Triple objective of the prohibition:

- 1) **Fiscal discipline:** Member States need to finance themselves under market conditions.
- 2) **Central bank independence :** avoid the financial ‘capture’ of the central banks by the State; primacy of price stability over fiscal difficulties of Member States.
- 3) **Price stability:** financing a State creates inflationary risks.

The three objectives are met in the design of the OMT:


- 1) OMT will only be used only if and when a Member State submits to binding conditionality
- 2) ECB retains full independent capacity to activate or stop the OMT at any time – no commitment; only secondary market.
- 3) Injected liquidity by the operation of the OMT is to be re-absorbed to ‘sterilise’ its quantitative effect – no inflationary risks.

**CONCLUSION: TOTALLY WITHIN
THE LEGAL MANDATE OF THE EUROSISTEM**



The integration of banking supervision

**Banking
regulation: EU-27**




**Supervision: Non-
euro area**


Non-euro area national competent authorities	ECB + euro area national competent authorities
National supervisory rules	ECB supervisory direction

**Supervision:
Euro area**

ECB supervisory function: governance



ECB supervisory function: organisation



ECB supervisory function: tasks



Micro-prudential supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Authorisation and withdrawal of credit institutions - Qualifying holdings - Compliance with prudential requirements - Governance arrangements - Stress-tests 	<i>Competent authority</i> <i>Consolidated supervisor</i> <i>Participation in colleges</i> <i>Host authority for non euro area branches</i>
Macro-prudential supervision	Capital buffers and other macro-prudential instruments	<i>Designated authority</i>
Financial conglomerates	Supplementary supervision	<i>Coordinator</i>
Bank resolution	Early intervention measures	
Representation at the EBA	Coordinate and express an euro area common position	
ESM – Recapitalisation of credit institutions	Assistance of the Commission in implementing tasks entrusted by the ESM	

ECB supervisory function: powers

Powers of national competent authorities (micro-prudential supervision) and designated authorities (macro-prudential supervision)

Requests for information


General investigations

On-site inspections

Authorisation/Withdrawal

Sanctions (ECB regime, CRD IV sanctions, action by national authorities)

ECB Supervisory function: timetable



- Supervision of banks having received or requested public assistance
- ECB decision

- At least ½ of the euro area banking sector

Exiting the euro

1.- Exclusive competence of the Union: ⇒ Art. 3 TEU; ⇒ Adoption of the € entails a transfer of competence to Union level ⇒ the € is a common currency of several States issued under a joint & several mode by the Eurosystem (not by individual NCBs). ⇒ the *Lex Monetae* is EU law.

2.- No legal basis to exit: The Treaty only foresees the possibility to exit from the European Union (Art. 50 TEU) ⇒ No “opt-out” foreseen other than UK and Denmark ⇒ Use of the “Flexibility clause” (Art. 352 Treaty): **not possible** to contradict or amend the Treaty, only to supplement ⇒ Many Treaty provisions would be disregarded in case of an exit ⇒ **Treaty of withdrawal needed.**

3.- Prohibition to establish capital controls: Within the EU restrictions to capital movements are clearly prohibited. Exceptions foreseen do not cover unilateral exit.

Exiting the euro (and 2)

Consequences of an unilateral national withdrawal:

- a) Flight of capital ⇒ a “bank deposit freeze (*Corralito*)” = illegal.
- b) Re-denomination of **contracts**: a mess of possible conflicts (lex monetae –EU- vs. , lex contractus, lex forii, lex loci debitoris, lex loci creditoris, lex solvendi, *commercial sense*, *common sense*, equity, pro domo sua, etc.) E ⇒ contract continuity at risk ⇒ economic chaos. uro
- c) Mismatch of balance sheets: assets/liabilities ⇒ **litigation**.
- d) Acceleration of debts, public and private, credit event, fall of *ratings*, closing-down of **access to external financing**.
- e) Introduction of a **new currency**: complexity, costs, creation of new references (i.e. substitution of Euribor), new monetary policy (high rates), immediate devaluations, new payments and clearing systems.
- f) Legal liability of the State acting illegally; massive **indemnities**.
- g) Possible suspension of **voting rights** in the institutions (Art. 7 TEU), also within the **Governing Council of the ECB**.

Any question?



Thanks for your attention!

[DISCLAIMER: THIS PRESENTATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ECB, BUT THE OPINION OF THE SPEAKER]