

# **EU and euro area: latest developments**

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Quadrilateral Meeting  
13 September 2012

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# The Outright Monetary Transactions program



**Adopted** by ECB 6 September 2012

**Legal basis:** Art. 18.1 Statute ECB: the Eurosystem may “**operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright ... marketable instruments**”.

**Objective:** “safeguard the monetary policy **transmission mechanism** in all countries of the euro area  
“preserve the **singleness** of ECB’s monetary policy”  
“ensure the proper transmission of ECB’s policy stance to the **real economy** throughout the area”  
“address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in particular, **unfounded fears** on the part of investors of the **reversibility** of the euro.”  
“if not addressed, these conditions would have severe consequences for the maintenance of **price stability**”

**Legal doubts** by the media: OMT runs against the **prohibition of monetary financing** for Eurosystem central banks.

# The Outright Monetary Transactions program (2)

## Art. 123 EU Treaty prohibits the Eurosystem the “direct purchases of public debt instruments ”

An implementing Council Regulation prohibits the **circumvention** of such prohibition in cases of secondary market purchases.


### Triple objective of the prohibition:

- 1) **Fiscal discipline:** Member States need to finance themselves under market conditions.
- 2) **Central bank independence :** avoid the financial ‘capture’ of the central banks by the State; primacy of price stability over fiscal difficulties of Member States.
- 3) **Price stability:** financing a State creates inflationary risks.

### The three objectives are met in the design of the OMT:


- 1) OMT will only be used only if and when a Member State submits to binding conditionality
- 2) ECB retains full independent capacity to activate or stop the OMT at any time – no commitment; only secondary market.
- 3) Injected liquidity by the operation of the OMT is to be re-absorbed to ‘sterilise’ its quantitative effect – no inflationary risks.

**CONCLUSION: TOTALLY WITHIN  
THE LEGAL MANDATE OF THE EUROSISTEM**



# The integration of banking supervision

**Banking  
regulation: EU-27**




**Supervision: Non-  
euro area**


Non-euro area national competent authorities	ECB + euro area national competent authorities
National supervisory rules	ECB supervisory direction

**Supervision:  
Euro area**

# ECB supervisory function: governance



# ECB supervisory function: organisation



# ECB supervisory function: tasks

<b>Micro-prudential supervision</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Authorisation and withdrawal of credit institutions</li> <li>- Qualifying holdings</li> <li>- Compliance with prudential requirements</li> <li>- Governance arrangements</li> <li>- Stress-tests</li> </ul>	<i>Competent authority</i>  <i>Consolidated supervisor</i>  <i>Participation in colleges</i>  <i>Host authority for non euro area branches</i>
<b>Macro-prudential supervision</b>	Capital buffers and other macro-prudential instruments	<i>Designated authority</i>
<b>Financial conglomerates</b>	Supplementary supervision	<i>Coordinator</i>
<b>Bank resolution</b>	Early intervention measures	
<b>Representation at the EBA</b>	Coordinate and express an euro area common position	
<b>ESM – Recapitalisation of credit institutions</b>	Assistance of the Commission in implementing tasks entrusted by the ESM	

# ECB supervisory function: powers

**Powers of national competent authorities (micro-prudential supervision) and designated authorities (macro-prudential supervision)**

**Requests for information**


**General investigations**

**On-site inspections**

**Authorisation/Withdrawal**

**Sanctions (ECB regime, CRD IV sanctions, action by national authorities)**

# ECB Supervisory function: timetable



- Supervision of banks having received or requested public assistance
- ECB decision

- At least ½ of the euro area banking sector

# Exiting the euro

**1.- Exclusive competence of the Union:** ⇒ Art. 3 TEU; ⇒ Adoption of the € entails a transfer of competence to Union level ⇒ the € is a common currency of several States issued under a joint & several mode by the Eurosystem (not by individual NCBs). ⇒ the *Lex Monetae* is EU law.

**2.- No legal basis to exit:** The Treaty only foresees the possibility to exit from the European Union (Art. 50 TEU) ⇒ No “opt-out” foreseen other than UK and Denmark ⇒ Use of the “Flexibility clause” (Art. 352 Treaty): **not possible** to contradict or amend the Treaty, only to supplement ⇒ Many Treaty provisions would be disregarded in case of an exit ⇒ **Treaty of withdrawal needed.**

**3.- Prohibition to establish capital controls:** Within the EU restrictions to capital movements are clearly prohibited. Exceptions foreseen do not cover unilateral exit.

# Exiting the euro (and 2)

## Consequences of an unilateral national withdrawal:

- a) Flight of capital ⇒ a “bank deposit freeze (*Corralito*)” = illegal.
- b) Re-denomination of **contracts**: a mess of possible conflicts (lex monetae –EU- vs. , lex contractus, lex forii, lex loci debitoris, lex loci creditoris, lex solvendi, *commercial sense, common sense, equity, pro domo sua, etc.*) ⇒ contract continuity at risk ⇒ economic chaos. **uro**
- c) Mismatch of balance sheets: assets/liabilities ⇒ **litigation**.
- d) Acceleration of debts, public and private, credit event, fall of *ratings*, closing-down of **access to external financing**.
- e) Introduction of a **new currency**: complexity, costs, creation of new references (i.e. substitution of Euribor), new monetary policy (high rates), immediate devaluations, new payments and clearing systems.
- f) Legal liability of the State acting illegally; massive **indemnities**.
- g) Possible suspension of **voting rights** in the institutions (Art. 7 TEU), also within the **Governing Council of the ECB**.

# Any question?



## Thanks for your attention!

[DISCLAIMER: THIS PRESENTATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ECB, BUT THE OPINION OF THE SPEAKER]